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Kant's Examples

AT THE CONCLUSION OF "The Methodology of Taste," the closing section of the first part of *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant evokes as an exemplary moment a cultural situation that resembles what a series of cultural thinkers, notably Georg Lukács and Mikhail Bakhtin, will conceive to be the moment of epic:

There was an age and there were nations in which the active impulse towards a social life *regulated by laws*—what converts a people into a permanent community—grappled with the huge difficulties presented by the trying problem of bringing freedom (and therefore equality also) into union with constraining force (more that of respect and dutiful submission than of fear). And such must have been the age, and such the nation, that first discovered the art of reciprocal communication of ideas between the more cultured and ruder sections of the community, and how to bridge the difference between the amplitude and refinement of the former and the natural simplicity and originality of the latter—in this way hitting upon that mean between higher culture and the modest worth of nature, that forms for taste also, as a sense common to all mankind, that true standard which no rules can supply.

Hardly will a later age dispense with those models.¹

It is a moment of appealing utopianism in a heretofore rigorously theoretical work, one whose appeal can scarcely have been negligible in the disintegrating postfeudal condition of late-eighteenth-century Germany. It can be taken as a document for an historic compromise between an intellectually powerful bourgeoisie with a comparatively underdeveloped economic base and a traditionally powerful but embattled aristocracy confronting the specter of bourgeois revolution. As such, this passage may appear as a blueprint, if not *the* blueprint, for defining the political function of aesthetic culture.² For this idealized representation of cultural harmony marks the turn of a "disinterested" aesthetic into an interest that is not merely *moral*—for the explicit function of judgment is indeed to mediate from sense and understanding to ethics and reason—but also political. The universal claims of aesthetic culture, the postulation of aesthetic judgment *as if* it were valid for all men, are most political precisely where they claim to be least so, representing, in the very denial of interest, the bourgeois interest in forging a sphere of purely formal equality and identity for all mankind, irrespective of cultural or economic distinctions. The aesthetic sphere is held to transcend all such "contingent" differences, and, with less paradox than might at first appear, it is in the turn to this domain as the *beyond* of political interest that the

formal terms of bourgeois ideology are constituted. As we shall see, any reflection upon the aesthetic therefore entails a reflection upon the constitutive elements of bourgeois ideology, and that particularly in relation to the pedagogical formation of the subject.³

The concern of this essay, then, is with the fate of aesthetic disinterest when it falls back, as it must, on a pedagogical imperative in order to realize the very conditions of its possibility. To formulate the relation schematically, if judgment mediates between understanding and reason, it is pedagogy that constitutes the bridge between politics and ethics. Understanding politics as a mode of freedom effective in the sphere of nature, one can easily grasp how politics itself should require the aesthetic sphere to enable the interaction of what are, for Kant, otherwise entirely discrete spheres. Any pedagogy formed according to aesthetic reflection will therefore be constitutive of the very possibility of politics itself. Central to the analysis of these relations here will be some questions as to the status of the *exemplary* (with which we can scarcely dispense) in the aesthetic and in the pedagogical spheres, questions that will be akin to logically adjacent ones of representation in the political sphere.

Kant's cultural ideal is not merely ideal; it has the status of an example (*Muster*). As an exemplary moment, and there are others in the *Third Critique*, it draws up into a transcendental analysis questions that are inevitably historical.⁴ This is not merely a matter of Kant's adducing an historical example by way of illustrating a possible cultural synthesis. That he should do so and, at the end of a century that had foregrounded the Roman model to the point of inspiring both 1776 and 1789, that he should choose what is apparently a Greek model are doubtless in themselves interesting details of intellectual history.⁵ But the very problem we find in establishing with any certainty that it is indeed the Greek model that Kant has here in mind is indicative of a far more profound, and in this context profoundly problematic, historicization of the aesthetic by way of examples that are as indispensable to the aesthetic itself as they are to "later ages." Our difficulty arises from the fact that Kant's exemplary moment is a formalization of a specific cultural moment which, to adapt his own terms, derives a concept from a manifold of (historical) phenomena. The concept in question is clearly regulative rather than constitutive: we could not construct such a culture for ourselves, but its supposed prior existence nonetheless regulates our judgment according to the idea of an exemplary union of freedom and constraint. The aesthetic judgment involved here demands the formalization of the specific example (*Beispiel*) in order that it may become exemplary (*musterhaft*) and the singular instance gain universal validity.

Universal validity is achieved in such a manner by an aesthetic judgment that, in this as in other instances, the formal qualities apparently attributed to the object (namely the reconciliation of freedom and constraint, the individual and the collective) are in the first instance properties of the judgment itself:

By the name *sensus communis* is to be understood the idea of a *public* sense, i.e. a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of every one else, in order, *as it were*, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgement. . . . This . . . is effected by so far as possible letting go of the element of matter, i.e. sensation, in our general state of representative activity, and confining attention to the formal peculiarities of our representation or general state of representative activity. (*CJ*, § 40, p. 151; emphasis in original)

The “common” or “public” sense that is involved here appears as at one and the same time the foundation for and the product of the mode of judgment that recurrently produces and depends upon the identity of the individual subject with mankind in general. The insistence of such a circularity at the foundation of aesthetic judgment enforces a formal historicization of the aesthetic that is inextricable from its dependence on the exemplary.

To elaborate this point: it would be possible to conceive of the relationship between the individual subject and mankind in general as a spatial figure, the subject being set then over against the humanity from which it is differentiated. Such a spatial figure would perhaps highlight the geography of relations of domination and would certainly accentuate questions of interest. Indeed, such a figure has a certain self-evidence, a self-evidence that crystallizes in moments of struggle in the fundamentally antirepresentational forms of barricades and guerilla warfare, where the political and the aesthetic might be said to coalesce.⁶ Kant’s example, however, saves representation precisely by endowing a geography of differences with a temporal disposition, effective at more than one level. In the first place, the example (*Beispiel* or *Muster*), as an aesthetic presentation that will become the means to the formation of a concept of “happy union” (*glücklichen Vereinigung*), is suspended between its own age and a later one (*Das Zeitalter . . . ein späteres Zeitalter*). For the first, being to itself an unreflective totality, this cultural solution cannot be exemplary; for the later age, the example becomes the mark of a certain inadequacy or falling away from an exemplary original. But in this suspension, the presentation of the exemplary moment becomes its representation as representative, not of itself but of an ideal to which even the example itself must be seen as inadequate. If a later age continues to depend upon an earlier example to conceive of a possible union between constraint and freedom, culture and nature, its very movement away from nature (*weil es der Natur immer weniger nahe sein wird*), in the *historical* process that differentiates “universal communication” from “the narrow life of the lower animals,” necessitates the independence of judgment from the very examples with which it hardly can dispense.

This paradoxical demand is rooted in the first place in the problem of a common sense that is at once the *a priori* foundation of taste *and* its product. The common sense that is the foundation of taste, precisely as a *sense*, cannot be

deduced transcendently or be supplied by universal rule: its exercise as its manifestation depends upon prior examples. But the danger of this dependence is that it threatens to produce dependence in the very subject whose relation to judgment should be one of “free conformity to law.” (Without this relation of the individual to humanity in general, we could not even speak of “common sense,” for without autonomous subjects there could be no communication through which the universality of common sense could be realized.) At the same time, that common sense which is a universal human property and foundation of the aesthetic, to which appeal is always made in the processes of aesthetic judgment, is in the first place a latency which must be drawn out and made manifest by the force of examples. The example, a formalization of the particular such that it comes to represent a universal idea, is indispensable to the production of the common sense on which assent to its exemplary or representative status is based. It is the *sine qua non* of a pedagogy which must produce in its subjects that common sense from which it derives its legitimacy.

An exemplary pedagogy, by virtue of its dependence on examples, must accordingly always entail a formally historical formation of its subjects. This formal historicity is evident at several levels: 1) The exemplary status of the examples called upon in pedagogical practice is predicated on a formalization that is historical, dependent at once on a lapse and an idealizing projection. 2) Only temporally is the common sense latent in each and every human subject realized or developed. 3) The subject of pedagogy is always belated with regard to the examples that are held up for judgment. 4) The subject of pedagogy always falls short of the examples that are projected. 5) The pedagogue is always exemplary for the student, that is, at once precedent and projected as a model. We will elaborate each one of these propositions in turn.

1) We have already seen, in relation to an example, how the example contains an historical structure, predicated on an historically necessary lapse away from what looks like the natural immediacy of an historical culture to itself and projected forward as exemplary of what must be reproduced, artificially or by way of pedagogical formalization, in a future state. Further analysis, by means of a further formalization, will show that the historical character of this example is not an accidental result of the general claims being made but is intrinsic to the structure of the example as such. For an example is always an example for the judgment and, in order to have the general validity or universal communicability of the exemplary (i.e., of that to which the assent of other judgments may be at least formally demanded), the example must be judged for its formal and not for its material or accidental qualities (*CJ*, § 40, p. 151). In the first place, then, comes the presentation of a sensuous manifold, relatively accidental in its internal relations, and only in the second place its representation for the judgment, “letting go of the element of matter” and “confining our attention to the formal peculiarities of our representation or general state of representative activity” (*ibid.*).

Insofar as it serves as an example, therefore, any object of judgment, whether an apparently atemporal form such as a Grecian urn or an apparently historical matter such as Greek culture, necessarily involves a temporal structure in the movement from presentation to representation, from *Beispiel* to *Muster* (*bleibende Beispiel*) and finally to *Begriff* (see *KU*, 300).

2) The exemplarity of the example in its temporal structure is not a characteristic of the object itself (indeed, as we have seen in the example of Greek culture, it cannot be exemplary to or for itself) but must be referred to the “general state of representative activity” of the judging subject. The temporality of the example for this subject is already a function of an exemplary temporality in each act of judgment. If we consider the form only of the act of judgment, abstracted from its specific material instance, it becomes exemplary of *any* act of judgment as a universally valid representation of common sense, and that precisely by virtue of the temporal movement from the material to the formal that is definitive of such a judgment. But the act of judgment, formally considered, is simultaneously exemplary of the relation between judgment and the production of common sense, since the repetition of acts of judgment in their formality itself constitutes the sphere of common sense both within each individual and as a public sphere. This entails an analogous formalization, whereby each act of judgment becomes exemplary by rising above “subjective and personal conditions” and by being weighed against the *possible* rather than the actual judgments of others. The formalization within each judgment is therefore exemplary of a necessary formalization of all judgment that is constitutive of the public sphere of common sense. It is not difficult to show that, for Kant, the process described here is formally identical with that which the human race undergoes in the movement from the primitive immediacy of gratification characteristic of “the savage” to the interest in “universal communication” characteristic of civilization.⁷

3) It is to this process of formalization that an exemplary pedagogy is directed, assuming as its metahistorical poles a prior immediacy from which the example lapses (or rises: theology is never far off here)⁸ and a projected universal communicability that is at once its goal and its product. On the one hand, it depends on examples, without which it could not produce a *concept* of its end and without which, more importantly, it would become a systematic or “mechanical” rather than an exemplary pedagogy; that is, it would operate by way of determinate concepts upon the understanding rather than by evoking the free play of the subjective judgment. On the other hand, dependence upon examples remains a constant threat to what is to be produced, namely, a free relation of the subject to itself and to others, that is, a *free* conformity to law. There is, at first, the purely empirical problem that the subject of pedagogy has the example held up before him or her, that she or he comes always after the fact and depends upon the example for edification. That is, however, merely a way of expressing the more critical point that, precisely because it is a mode of *sense*, common sense cannot

be manifested or produced in the absence of examples. Which is to say that, in a certain sense, what is most original to human being, the foundation of judgment and of communication if not, indeed, of reason itself, is not autonomous but actually depends upon its objects.⁹ The sphere of common sense, properly one that establishes the identity and equality of all judging human subjects as possible by way of formalization, can only be produced or reproduced by way of the constant insistence of its instantiations. The power of the example over the student is accordingly itself a formal and not merely incidental characteristic of aesthetic pedagogy. It is not merely that dependence on examples—“the go-carts of the judgement”¹⁰—hampers the independence of the mind emerging from tutelage insofar as the student mistakes the example for the rule, thereby fixating on the particular matter rather than the general form. That dependence is moreover a necessary formal consequence of the intrinsic historicity of examples themselves, “with which a later age can scarcely dispense.”

4) The dependence of the belated student upon historical examples is matched by the students’ inadequacy with regard to the exemplary as projected ideal, and again in consequence of the formal *historicity* of the exemplary. The necessary contingent inadequacy of the student to the ideal projected by pedagogy, a function, so to speak, of lacking age, experience, erudition, or whatever, as well as of institutional positioning, is here no more than the expression of a systematic incapacity. Only by the achievement of an entire independence from examples, as the matter of or for judgment, could the judging subject attain to the pure formality of the ideal. But even supposing the example were given of an exemplary pedagogy, such indeed as Kant describes here, in which examples continually give way to a process of formalization that seeks to dispense with them, the ideal remains strictly inconceivable without an—even minimal—instance of exemplification that is finally irreducible as what must have been formalized.

5) One result of this twofold shortcoming of the student is the inexpugible melancholy of the pedagogical scene, even, if not especially, in its ironic mode. A certain theological residue taints even the most secular accounts of liberal education with the idea of a fall from the self-immediacy of that which becomes exemplary but is not that for itself, with the anxiety of an unattainable redemption. But the allure of a melancholy aura should not prevent recognition of the intimate relation between precisely such a model of enlightened education, directed at developing the autonomy of the students by way of an always projective displacement of “truth,” and the institutions of pedagogy themselves, with their humane hierarchies of power that the geography of every classroom reproduces and reinforces beneath the temporal scheme it frames.¹¹ We will return to locate the logical ground of this relation in the universal claims made by liberal or aesthetic education, as by critical philosophy generally, concentrating here on the exemplary status of the pedagogue as presented by Kant.

The demand made by Kant upon the Master is that he should be at once exemplary and the site of examples: “Der Meister muß es *vormachen* was und wie es der Schuler zu Stande bringen soll.”¹² The act of exemplification is here at once spatial and temporal: if the Master can stand before the students in his role as exemplar, it is only because he has done before what they in their turn must do after his example. What the Master’s standing in the classroom spatially represents, namely a punctual gathering of disparate and ill-informed subjectivities to the light of the exemplary, represents more importantly a temporal relation in which, as exemplary, the Master is at once prior and projected, instance (*Beispiel*) and model (*Muster*). Needless to say, the exemplary status of the pedagogue has nothing to do with personal or moral character; it is an effect of the historical structure of exemplification as it informs what is precisely a *liberal* education. The incidental, material, and spatial presence of the Master, a *Beispiel* whose singularity becomes indifferent, is assumed in his transformation along temporal lines into a *Muster* that is, as is any example that is truly exemplary, projected toward an ideal.

One might say, according to the logic of the example outlined above, that it is intrinsic to the function of the exemplary pedagogue to disappoint. Following both this logic and that of the liberal education that Kant here sketches, it becomes clear that the “perfect” pedagogue, insofar as such a prodigy is conceivable, would be as imperfect an example as would the pedantic pedagogue whose practice is limited to the inculcation of rules and regulations by rote. For it is the force of the example to fall short of the ideal to which it gestures, just as it is the proper procedure of the pedagogue to point out this shortcoming of the example with regard to the ideal:

Only by exciting the pupil’s imagination to conformity with a given concept, by pointing out how the expression falls short of the idea to which, as aesthetic, the concept itself fails to attain, and by means of severe criticism, is it possible to prevent his promptly looking upon the examples [*Beispiele*] set before him as the prototypes of excellence, and as models [*Muster*] for him to imitate, without submission to any higher standard or to his own critical judgement. This would result in genius being stifled, and, with it, also the freedom of the imagination in its very conformity to law—a freedom without which a fine art is not possible, nor even as much as a correct taste of one’s own for estimating it. (*CJ*, § 60, p. 226)

This passage, which amounts to a sketch of the procedures of a liberal as well as a specifically artistic education, is deeply informed by a structure of disappointment, or of un-deception, *Ent-tauschung*. In the realm of the aesthetic, every concept must be revealed to be a deception, since it is only the *formal* possibility of being subsumed under a concept that the example should represent. The free play of the understanding and the imagination would otherwise be stifled, and with that the possibility of the reconciled and reconciling work of the genius. Accordingly, in the relationship between the Master and the students as in that between the concept and the judgment, all that the Master exemplifies (*vormacht*)

must disappoint if his pedagogy is to be exemplary. The students' disappointment in the Master, itself a crucial moment in aesthetic education, is the fulfillment of a process of exemplification whose goal is to produce autonomy of judgment in the student.

Clearly, of course, the exemplary standing of the pedagogue is formally unaffected by the disappointment of the students. Rather, that exemplary status is reinforced by a transition in the students' relation to the example from concentration on its material or conceptual instantiation of apparent rules of procedure to the process by which *aesthetic* judgments are to be made. The pedagogue now exemplifies the process of enlightenment that is initiated by the perception of the perpetual and determinate inadequacy of the example to the ideal. It would be correct to say that the exemplary standing of the pedagogue is, in consequence, an ineradicable effect of structure merely, were it not for the fact that the material presence of the Master is a crucial moment in the temporality of exemplification. In accordance with the historical structure of any example, it is the spatial presentation of the pedagogue, the there-beforeness of the Master in all his materiality, that must be overcome or displaced by a temporal representation founded in the fact of the Master's absolute priority—his always having been there before—but is then deferred into the perpetual inadequacy of the model to the ideal. We can see that, in this movement from presence to deferral, the structure of the example is retained, such that the disappointment discovered in the inadequacy of the pedagogue gives way to an exemplariness founded in a process of projection which the Master now comes to represent to the students.

There is consequently no escape from the insistence of the exemplary within this model pedagogy. Or rather, there is one, but only for the genius, a concept that in a very real sense is required within the *Third Critique* to create a rupture, in the form of exemplary freedom, in the otherwise dismal continuities of exemplary repetition. The concept of the genius in the *Third Critique* has been frequently enough discussed elsewhere to need little elaboration here.¹³ Suffice it to say that the principal problem for Kant is to account for a productivity which is apparently at once rule-bound and free, which, in other words, achieves what is elsewhere impossible, a following of examples combined with independence of them:

It [the rule] cannot be one set down in a formula and serving as a precept—for then the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather must the rule be gathered from the performance, i.e., from the product, which others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it serve as a model [*Muster*], not for *imitation* [*Nachmachung*], but for *following* [*Nachahmung*]. (*CJ*, § 47, p. 171; *KU*, 245)¹⁴

“The possibility of this is difficult to explain,” Kant goes on, and at least part of the difficulty is to explain the possibility of a following of examples that has nothing to do with learning. The opposition of genius to learning is abso-

lute, since “learning is nothing but imitation” (*CJ*, § 40, p. 169). For the genius, the example (here, *Beispiel*) is no more than a minimal stimulus to production according to natural gifts that are original to him and that work “on similar lines” (*auf ähnliche Art*) to those of the previous genius (*CJ*, § 47, p. 170). The genius stands outside the repetitions of an exemplary pedagogy, since his skills can be neither communicated nor learned and since the originality of the genius is not progressive but returns always to the same ground in nature. Paradoxically for aesthetics, the repetition proper to Genius is one that cannot *develop* and for precisely that reason leaves the freedom of the subject intact.

For all that, genius remains exemplary: it is the “exemplary originality [*musterhafte Originalität*] of the natural endowments of an individual in the *free* employment of his cognitive faculties” (*CJ*, § 49, p. 181; *KU*, 255). Exemplary for the subsequent genius only in the accidental or contingent sense implied above, the genius produces for humanity at large exemplary products for the judgment of *taste*. Unlike genius, taste is a progressive faculty and intimately associated with pedagogy. Indeed, as we have seen, the progressive formation of taste is inseparable from an exemplary pedagogy. The problem that arises here is that although the concept of genius indicates an example of human freedom independent of imitation, it provides no solution to producing that freedom in the sphere of pedagogy. Not that this would be a problem, were it not that what defines genius is effectively that to which the formation of taste is intended to bring the subject, namely, to the perfect reconciliation of freedom and constraint. (Hence, of course, the ease with which the conditions for the possibility of a “correct taste” are subsumed within those for the possibility of a “fine art” at all; *CJ*, § 60, p. 226.)

The discussion of genius thus recapitulates in many respects the discussion of taste that precedes it. In other, equally important respects it is incompatible with the terms established for the development of taste. To reiterate, both the concepts of *development* and of *autonomy* are inseparable from the concept of taste. Thus, in section 32, Kant writes of the young poet:

It is only in aftertime, when his judgement has been sharpened by exercise, that of his own free will and accord he deserts his former judgements—behaving in just the same way as with those of his judgements which depend wholly on reason. Taste lays claim simply to autonomy. To make the judgements of others the determining ground of one’s own would be heteronomy. (*CJ*, § 32, p. 137)

Though the young poet can by no means be coerced to conform to the judgment of others, nonetheless in the independent development of his taste he comes to conform. The possibility, indeed from a certain standpoint the inevitability, of this process derives from a formal identity in the mode of aesthetic judgment in all subjects that permits the claim to universality of a judgment of taste “just as if it were objective” (*CJ*, § 32, p. 136).¹⁵ The process of judgment occurs conse-

quently in a fashion which seems to make no firm distinction between that process as it takes place in the genius or in the mere person of taste:

Following [*Nachfolge*] which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation [*Nachahmung*], is the proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary [*exemplarischen*] author may exert upon others—and this means no more than going to the same sources for a creative work [*aus denselben Quellen schöpfen*] as those to which he went for his creations, and learning from one's predecessor no more than the mode of availing oneself of such sources. Taste, just because its judgement cannot be determined by concepts or precepts, is among all faculties and talents the very one that stands most in need of examples [*Beispiele*] of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem [*in Beifall*]. Thus it avoids an early lapse into crudity, and a return to the rudeness of its earliest efforts. (*CJ*, § 327, pp. 138–39; *KU*, 213; emphasis in original)

It is the process of *development* that again distinguishes two faculties—genius and taste—which are otherwise apparently identical in their processes, both demanding originality and autonomy, both required to return to exemplary instances for procedures not for rules.¹⁶ Genius constitutes an exceptional example, by definition unpredictable in the mode of its productions, which in turn only make the transition from instance to model by way of aesthetic judgment. Where the products of genius, and indeed initially the objects of aesthetic judgment in general, are conceived as *Beispiele*, it is taste that identifies their exemplary (*musterhaft*) quality. It is not hard to be convinced of the regularity of this conceptual patterning in the *Third Critique*: time and again, the term *Beispiel* is employed for objects that are in the process of being or have yet to be taken up into the judgments of taste or that, for the subsequent genius, are mere initiating instances to be followed, not imitated. *Muster*, and its adverbial derivative *musterhaft* (or, less often, *exemplarisch*), on the contrary, are reserved for that which is projected as exemplary in the stronger sense of a model for the estimation of all attainments or judgments. Insofar as *Beispiele* become exemplary, *musterhaft*, a developmental logic is intrinsic here; insofar as a development is implied from the casual intuition to a universal claim, what is narrated is the critical move from private judgment to “universal communicability.” The analysis of aesthetic judgment as a faculty is thus governed by its implication in the form of universal history, for which the insistence of the exemplary is indispensable, just as the aesthetic judgment itself both produces and estimates progress toward universal communicability on the basis of examples, *Beispiele*, that through it become *Muster*:

But in the universal communicability of the sensation (of delight or aversion)—a communicability, too, that exists apart from any concept—in the accord, so far as possible, of all ages and nations as to this feeling in the representation of certain objects, we have the empirical criterion, weak indeed and scarce sufficient to raise a presumption, of the derivation of a taste, thus confirmed by examples [*Beispiele*], from grounds deep-seated and

shared alike by all men, underlying their agreement in estimating the forms under which objects are given to them.

For this reason some products of taste are looked on as *exemplary* [*exemplarisch*]. (*CJ*, §17, p. 75; *KU*, 149)

The problem that recurs here for taste, one by definition absent in the case of productive genius, is how to guarantee the *autonomy* of judgments of taste under the condition of their constitutive dependence on examples. The argument that follows anticipates that made much later in section 60, though with specific reference to taste rather than to genius:

For this reason some products of taste are looked on as *exemplary* [*exemplarisch*—not meaning thereby that by imitating others taste may be acquired. For taste must be an original faculty; whereas one who imitates a model [*Muster*], while showing skill commensurate with his success, only displays taste as himself a critic of this model [*zeigt, sofern er es trifft, zwar Geschicklichkeit, aber nur Geschmack, sofern er dieses Muster selbst beurteilen kann*]. Hence it follows that the highest model [*das höchste Muster*], the archetype [*Urbild*] of taste, is a mere idea, which each person must beget in his own consciousness, and according to which he must form his estimate of everything that is an Object of taste, or that is an example [*Beispiel*] of critical taste, and even of universal taste itself. (*CJ*, §17, pp. 75–76; *KU*, 149–50)

The archetype of taste must be autonomously begotten or, rather, “brought forth” [*hervorbringen*] by each judging subject as the “highest example,” the example of examples by which all other examples, as mere *Beispiele*, are at first to be estimated. Clearly its attainment of the status of *idea*, however, would demand the impossible condition of the example of losing its exemplificatory status, crucial to which is its material instantiation in a representation of whatever kind. Even the highest of examples must fall short of the *idea* that is, as Kant goes on to remark, “a concept of reason,” i.e., not susceptible of representation, and be redefined as an *ideal*, “the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an idea”:

Hence this archetype of taste—which rests, indeed, upon reason’s indeterminate idea of a maximum, but is not, however, capable of being represented by means of concepts, but only in an individual presentation—may more appropriately be called the ideal of the beautiful. While not having this ideal in our possession, we still strive to beget it within us [*doch in uns hervorzubringen streben*]. (*CJ*, §17, p. 76; *KU*, 150)

What appears at first as the unproblematic begetting in each and every individual of an idea that would guarantee the subject’s critical autonomy becomes, by the very logic of the example and of the faculty proper to the aesthetic, i.e., the imagination, a striving after an unattainable possession. For no example can escape the condition of being given in a presentation even where its exemplary representation is projected toward the ideal to which no presentation could be adequate, nor can the activity of (aesthetic) judgment take place without such

examples being presented to it. The ideal is accordingly strictly and essentially unattainable, not for the contingent reason that mankind or its artists are not yet adequately cultivated, but according to the logic of the aesthetic itself.¹⁷

This logic of the aesthetic, predicated on the insistence of exemplary material, however residual or minimal it may become, places the ideal irrevocably out of reach. At the same time, it is the demand, equally intrinsic to the aesthetic, that judgments of taste be made autonomously, which leads, a little paradoxically, to the limits to be posed on the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere itself. For the necessity to pose an “ideal of beauty” as the only guarantee of the autonomy of each subject’s judgment of taste entails a movement from the purely aesthetic to the moral. Where an *ideal* is posited for any object, an underlying end must be determinable for that object. In consequence, “Only what has in itself the end of its real existence, only *man* that is able himself to determine his ends by reason . . . admits . . . of an ideal of *beauty*” (*CJ*, §17, p. 77).¹⁸ This figure of Man is at once the ground and the end of the aesthetic; like common sense, it is the basis on which the universality of the aesthetic can be posited and the end that moral reflection finds in the examples of taste. Encapsulated in section 17, “The Ideal of Beauty,” is the narrative that everywhere shapes the *Critique*, a narrative that moves from matter to form, from sense to commonality, from example to idea, from beauty to morality. It is also, crucially, the narrative within which the “normal idea,” which allows of cultural and geographical differences in perception and judgment (cf. *CJ*, §17, p. 78), is superseded by the rational idea whose proximal attainment is governed by a singular and ethical temporality. Within this narrative the importance of judgments of taste is to negotiate developmentally the circular movement from common *sense* to *common* sense and to do so by way of examples. This narrative is contained already in the historical character of the example and in the aesthetic disposition of the judging subject, in both cases proposing to mediate between the necessary difference of the particular and the equally necessary universality of communicability (*Mittelbarkeit*).

We have already seen how the historical structure of the example as such causes a perpetual deferral within the pedagogical scene, given that the ideal which the example represents is always beyond attainment.¹⁹ Now, since we see in section 17 that in order for the aesthetic to lead to the autonomy of the judging subject it must connect with the moral through the positing of an *ideal*, we can state that the process of this pedagogy must be ironic. For it entails the formal reflection of the subject upon the conditions of any judgment in particular upon an (exemplary) object as a condition at once for the judgment of its adequacy to the ideal and of the formal capacity of the subject as critic, i.e., as autonomous rather than dependent on the example. The formal reflection upon the particular reflection has an ironic narrative structure insofar as the secondary reflection always “knows more” than that prior one upon which it reflects, if only by virtue

of its generalization. This is to say that irony is always of a temporal or narrative nature and requires a developmental economy that is always at someone's expense.

To describe irony in these terms is of course immediately to take issue with what at present is probably the single most influential argument concerning the nature of irony, namely Paul de Man's essay "The Rhetoric of Temporality."²⁰ In part 2 of this essay, de Man emphasizes what are for him two crucial features of irony: the simultaneity of its split consciousness, appearing "as an instantaneous process that takes place rapidly, suddenly, in one single moment" (*BI*, 225), and its radical antagonism not only to historical thinking but also to the "reconciliation of the self with the world by means of art" (*BI*, 219) that is the burden of several versions of aesthetic history. To an extent, and despite the necessity it involves him in of skirting the problem raised by Lukács's (and, indeed, Bakhtin's) identification of the novel with an ironic consciousness, de Man's characterization of irony is persuasive.²¹ It is insufficient, however, precisely insofar as it ignores the developmental schema that structures the formal temporality of irony, regardless of whether its duration is the instantaneous apperception of a split consciousness or the extended narrative time of the novel. For as in the case of the exemplary, it is precisely the recognition of a perpetual *inadequacy* that regulates the pedagogical effect of an ironic aesthetic in a continuous "striving to attain" which, as indeed de Man puts it, appears as "an endless process that leads to no synthesis" (*BI*, 220). Only this division of the subject, between the material and the formal, the interested and the ethical, or, in the terms of Baudelaire's essay "De l'essence du rire," on which de Man leans, the inferior and the superior, produces the ethical Subject as a formal representative of the human. Accordingly, de Man's assertion that, for Baudelaire, superiority and inferiority "become merely spatial metaphors to indicate a discontinuity and a plurality of levels within a subject that comes to know itself by an increasing differentiation from what is not" (*BI*, 213), is not only erroneous but depends on a significant suppression of the explicitly "universal historical" framework of Baudelaire's essay. Within both the individual man and within humanity in general, Baudelaire contends, the capacity to perceive the comic, and eventually to transcend it in the aesthetic of a "poésie pure," is a product of specifically historical culture. The clarity with which Baudelaire's remark indicates the relation between the double nature of man and the folding over of the history of "l'homme" with that of "l'humanité"—another mode of "dédoublement"—makes it worth quoting at some length:

The comic, the power of laughter, lies in the one who laughs and in no way in the object of laughter. The man who falls does not laugh at his own fall, unless he is a philosopher, a man who has acquired, from habit, the capacity to divide himself [*se dédoubler*] rapidly and observe as a disinterested spectator the phenomena of his self. . . . Comparing, as we are entitled to, humanity to individual man [*l'humanité à l'homme*], we see that primitive nations, just like Virginie, cannot conceive of caricature and *have no comedies* (the holy

scriptures, of whatever nation, never laugh); and that, advancing little by little toward the cloudy peaks of intelligence, or bent over the dark furnaces of metaphysics, the nations begin to laugh diabolically with Melmoth's laugh; and finally that, if in these same ultracivilized nations an intelligence driven by superior ambition wishes to cross the limits of worldly pride and launch itself boldly toward pure poetry, in this poetry, limpid and profound as nature, laughter will be lacking as in the soul of the Sage.²²

Given its ironic premises, it is all the more striking that this passage should reproduce so accurately the developmental schema of aesthetic history in its movement from the supposed primitive incapacity for self-reflexive disinterest through the division of the subject, and of subject from subject, that this entails, to a possible transcendence of that division in an identity between the purest artifice and nature.

Far from representing a dismantling of the historical form of aesthetics, irony belongs in its very structure within the formal developmental temporality of the aesthetic. It is accordingly interesting to note, insofar as de Man attempts to associate irony with allegory in contradistinction to the symbol, that he evinces a similar blindness with regard to the metaironic structure of symbolist aesthetics itself. For it is an entire misreading of symbolist aesthetics to suggest that, in any simple sense, "in the world of the symbol it would be possible for the image to coincide with the substance" or that "the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification" (*BI*, 207). The error is appropriate, since it is precisely the ironic structure of symbolist aesthetics to present every symbol as, in effect, the symbol of an error: that is to say, the reflection upon any sign or object presented as symbolic entails the recognition of its inadequacy to the totality that it is held to represent. Precisely this inadequacy gives way to an ironic *methodology* of symbolism that causes the subject to seek to constitute the truth or totality which the object is inadequate to represent. Thus, to cite a quite representative passage from Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *The Friend*, in which he is discussing the communication of truth through "a right though inadequate notion":

Observe, how graciously Nature instructs her human children. She cannot give us the knowledge derived from sight without occasioning us at first to mistake images of reflection for substances. But the very consequences of the delusion lead inevitably to its detection; and out of the ashes of the error rises a new flower of knowledge. We not only see, but are enabled to discover by what means we see. So too we are under the necessity, in given circumstances, of mistaking a square for a round object; but ere the mistake can have any practical consequences, it is not only removed, but in its removal gives us the symbol of a new fact, that of distance.²³

Symbolist pedagogy shares the structure of the exemplary precisely insofar as what is involved in every instance is the production of a disappointment or un-deception. And as becomes very clear in the above passage, what this involves is always an ironic relation between the necessarily assumed naive perceiver and the superior consciousness.

It is, of course, the function of a liberal pedagogy to produce that ironic relation not only *between* subjects, as in the first instance through schooling, but also within each subject as an internalized ethical attitude. We might argue that the condition of such an ironic disposition is the fundamental prerequisite for the inculcation of ideology since it assumes, as an internal mechanism of the most formal and “transferrable” kind, the subordination of the individual to the universal.²⁴ It is at this point that pedagogy necessarily opens on to the political.

Furthermore, though this may seem surprising given the extent to which the ironic mode is habitually associated with a certain kind of autonomy of judgment, there is an intimate link between the ironic and the institutional insofar as the ironic is a *mode* rather than an incidental attitude. Exactly inasmuch as liberal pedagogy, as a consequence of its exemplary structure, is drawn toward an ironic disposition (or displacement) of power/knowledge relations, by the same token irony, as a mode, is inseparable from a split disposition of superiority/inferiority or of latent and manifest consciousness that must always make an example of someone. The ironic attitude is the internalized modality of the institutional geography of the classroom. The ironic attitude is, accordingly, the subjective counterpart to the idea of the canon, since only in relation to examples subject to a universalizing formalization can an ironic pedagogy take place. As the body of “exemplary products of taste” through which the judgment is cultivated for each subject, a canon is indispensable to that formalization of the judgment whose progressive nature is inspired by its own perpetual inadequacy to that example of examples, the ideal. The subjective relation to the canon implies, therefore, a progressive narrative of aesthetic consciousness whose assimilative force is in no way diminished—rather, it is augmented—by its formal interminability. Paradoxically, however, what the canonical examples exemplify is the “grounds deep-seated and shared alike by all men, underlying their agreement in estimating the forms under which objects are given to them” (*CJ*, § 17, p. 75). There is a tension, if not a contradiction, in other words, between the *function* of the canon as a body of examples subjected to judgment to the end of its development and the *lesson* of the canon, which is the transhistorical identity or equivalence of judgments of taste as of products of genius.²⁵ This paradox, which perhaps marks the transition from the historical relativism of the Enlightenment to the developmental universal histories of the nineteenth century, is only resolvable by subordinating a spatial distribution of differing cultural products and judgments to a temporal model of aesthetic development that entails an ethical judgment as to the adequacy of any given historical product or judgment to the ideal. The form in which any judgment takes place always remains identical; the development of judgment takes place through the increasing autonomy of its sphere, in the individual or in the species. Out of this paradox and its resolution will emerge the explicitly developmental aesthetic pedagogies that run through the nineteenth century from Friedrich Schiller to Matthew Arnold, though these will in turn come to be

haunted by the fundamental aporia of aesthetics, namely the difficulty, given their historical claims, of accounting for the continuing appeal of ancient artifacts.²⁶

This slippage from the aesthetic to the ethical is, as we have seen, not a misreading of the aesthetic but an elaboration of a productive contradiction that is an inevitable consequence of the universalizing claims of aesthetic philosophy even where it seems most resistant to practical application. There is, accordingly, no clear demarcation between Kant's "philosophical" deduction of the aesthetic and, for example, Schiller's pedagogical *Verwendung* of Kantian ideas: the latter is not so much a "regression" as, as in Hegel's perception of it, a completion of the logic of the *Third Critique*.²⁷ From its inception, aesthetics gives the example to a pedagogy with which it can scarcely dispense, requiring that pedagogy as the means to constitute the very space which grounds the verisimilitude of its examples. This space being that of "common sense," it provides in turn the fundamental condition both for the formation of political subjects in the specific form of "representative" individuals and for the apparent self-evidence of the canon as a body of representative texts. What this meshing of the aesthetic and the political within the field of pedagogy implies is that any sustained attempt to rethink the nature and function of cultural education from a radical perspective must pass by way of a prior critique of the political culture of representation. In the absence of such a critique, radical pedagogy will continue to reproduce, at the "microscopic" level of its implicit practices, the processes of ideological interpellation that its explicit tendency seeks to disrupt.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. with analytical indexes by James Creed Meredith (Oxford, 1982), § 60, p. 226–27, referred to in the text hereafter as *CJ*. Citations in German from the *Third Critique* are from *Kritik der Urteilstkraft*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1974), cited throughout in the text as *KU*. The allusions to Georg Lukács and Mikhail Bakhtin are, of course, to *Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), esp. chaps. 1 and 3; and to *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Holquist (Austin, Tex., 1981). Bakhtin remarks typically in the essay "Epic and the Novel" that "the epic world knows only a single and unified world view, obligatory and indubitably true for heroes as well as for authors and audiences" (35). It should be remarked from the outset that for Kant the organic nature of such a community is always already the product of an *art*, dependent on the form of the "as if" which, as we shall see, governs all aesthetic productions. It is not, therefore, a primal condition of the human disrupted by the advent of modernity as, with varying affect, it appears for Lukács and Bakhtin. This, as I argue at the end of this essay, is closely related to the ironic structure of exemplary pedagogy.
2. I have discussed the specifically *political* function of aesthetic culture in David Lloyd, "Arnold, Ferguson, Schiller: Aesthetic Culture and the Politics of Aesthetics," *Cultural*

Critique 2 (Winter 1985–86): 137–69; and in “Analogies of Aesthetics: The Politics of Culture and the Limits of Critique” (unpublished); in both I attempted to delineate some of the crucial historical determinants on the emergence of a doctrine of aesthetic culture in late-eighteenth-century Germany. The best account of the sociohistorical condition of Germany and of its bourgeois intelligentsia at this epoch is still W. H. Bruford, *Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Literary Revival* (1935; reprint ed., Cambridge, 1959). See also Georg Lukács, “Zur Aesthetik Schillers,” in *Werke*, vol. 10, *Probleme der Aesthetik* (Neuweid and Berlin, 1969), 18–19, 26–27, on the constraint on the German bourgeoisie to conceive of attaining the results of a bourgeois revolution without engaging in an actual revolution. More generally, see Nicolao Merker, *An den Ursprüngen der deutschen Ideologie: Revolution und Utopie im Jakobinismus*, trans. Manfred Buhr (Berlin, 1984), on the political situation of the German bourgeois intellectuals. In “Kant und die Wende zur Aesthetik,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 16 (1962): 252, Odo Marquard raises the question, in this context, as to whether the aesthetic should be seen as the instrument or the substitute for the political realization of ethical ideals.

3. I have elaborated the political function of the formalism of bourgeois aesthetics more extensively in Lloyd, “Arnold, Ferguson, Schiller,” esp. 166–68; and in “Genet’s Genealogy: European Minorities and the Ends of the Canon,” *Cultural Critique* 6 (Spring 1987): 161–85, esp. 171–72.
4. I should remark from the outset that since writing the first draft of this essay, I have been struck by Cathy Caruth’s conclusions on the narrative form of examples in the rather different context of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. As she remarks in her brilliant essay “The Force of Example: Kant’s Symbols,” *Yale French Studies* 74 (1988): 26, on account of the personification of philosophy itself “the mediation provided by the example must, therefore, be understood in narrative terms.” I seek here only to extend that remark to the structure of the example as such.
5. Karl Marx makes the celebrated comment in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow, 1977), 11, that the participants in the French Revolution “performed the task of their time in Roman costume and with Roman phrases.” The shift from Roman to Greek models as a crucial element in the formation of post-Enlightenment theories of culture has been apparent at least since Walter Pater’s essay on Winckelmann in *The Renaissance*. But the most important recent study is Martin Bernal’s *The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785–1985*, vol. 1 of *Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1987).
6. A full demonstration of the antirepresentational form of barricades and guerrilla warfare would require another essay. Crucial to both, however, is the breakdown of the process of temporal deferral constitutive of the political culture of representation and its replacement by the dramatically spatial disposition of social relations as relations of conflicting forces. T. J. Clark’s “The Picture of the Barricade,” chap. 1 of *The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848–1851* (Greenwich, Conn., 1973), is peculiarly suggestive on the difficulties of representing artistically the barricades thrown up by the people at the very point at which the possibility of their being represented politically has collapsed. The breakdown of representative politics is what Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* perceives as the critical element of 1848 and the Bonapartist coup. In more general terms, Michel Foucault remarks programmatically on the necessity to spatialize discursive forms in order to analyze the disposition of power relations:

Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which

knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. . . . Metaphorising the transformations of discourse in a vocabulary of time necessarily leads to the utilisation of the model of individual consciousness with its intrinsic temporality. Endeavouring on the other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through, and on the basis of relations of power.

“Questions of Geography,” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Gordon et al. (New York, 1980), 69–70. I would only contend, as throughout this essay, that at any given moment the apparently “intrinsic” temporality of the individual is produced, in the present instance pedagogically. The geography of classroom relations is a classic instance of the temporalization of power relations in which arbitrary dispositions of authority are legitimated by appeal to the transcendental temporality of the exemplary. What gives this locus of authority its verisimilitude is the folding over of this institutional temporality with what appears as the “intrinsic” temporality of the individual subject.

7. The argument concerning the social and developmental character of taste is made at *CJ*, § 41, pp. 155–56. I have discussed the relation between social development and the narrative internal to each act of judgment more fully in “Analogies of Aesthetics.” In “Parergon,” Jacques Derrida makes the suggestive but unfortunately “undeveloped” comment that

If on the other hand a determinate anthropology intervenes in this critique of aesthetic judgment, a whole theory of history, of society, and of culture makes the decision at what is the most formally critical moment. This theory weighs upon the frames with all its contents.

In *Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago, 1987), 105. This essay is intended to elaborate this observation.

8. See again Caruth’s “Force of Example,” 25, where the life of philosophy is seen to depend on the lifelessness of matter, a chiasmatic narrative that she attaches to a Christian narrative of redemption. The ethical narrative of universal history that informs exemplary pedagogy is easily envisaged as a secular transposition of the redemptive narrative of Christianity and clearly retains much of its temporal figurality.
9. I am indebted for this observation to T. W. Adorno’s exposition of the “primacy of the object” in the late essay “Subject and Object,” in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York, 1978), esp. 502–4.
10. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1978), 178.
11. Shoshana Felman’s very fine essay “Psychoanalysis and Education: Teaching Terminable and Interminable,” in “The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a Literary Genre,” *Yale French Studies* 63 (1982): 21–44, is instructive, if not exemplary, of ironic accounts of pedagogy, especially in its appeal to the potential *interminability* of teaching. This is open to critique not simply for the formalism of its analysis, which entirely ignores the *matter* of teaching, but also insofar as it overlooks the institutional geography of both psychoanalysis and pedagogy that shores up the effect of mastery, esoteric or not, even in the moment of its self-critique. Satya Mohanty’s “Radical Teaching, Radical Theory: The Ambiguous Politics of Meaning,” in *Theory in the Classroom*, ed. Cary Nelson (Urbana, Ill., 1986), 149–76, is a forceful critique of this and several other essays in the same volume for their purely “transcendental” radicalism.
12. *KU*, 299. I cite the German here since the English translation of *vormachen* (which my

- German dictionary defines, among others things, as *als Beispiel dienen*) as “illustrate” (*CJ*, § 60, p. 226) considerably reduces the semantic field of the original term.
13. Jacques Derrida’s “Economimesis,” trans. R. Klein, *Diacritics* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 3–25, is an indispensable analysis of the problematic of genius in the *Critique of Judgment* in relation to the differentiation of the aesthetic sphere. Timothy Gould’s “The Audience of Originality: Kant and Wordsworth on the Reception of Genius,” in *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics*, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago, 1982), 179–93, is a useful account of the relation between the definition of genius and the possibility of the communicability of its productions.
 14. Derrida comments on this passage and on the punning differentiation between *Nachahmung* and *Nachmachung* in “Economimesis,” 10–11.
 15. This formal identity of the mode of judgment can also be seen in terms of principles: see Immanuel Kant, *On Education* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960), 9: “Uniformity can only result when all men act according to the same principles, which principles would have to become with them a second nature.” That the poet now conforms autonomously to others’ judgments is an index that principles of judgment have become second nature in him.
 16. The other distinction to be made here is that which Kant makes between genius and science: science can be communicated methodically by sheer imitation, and distinctions in achievement are of degree, not kind; genius can never be communicated. By the same token, science is progressive and indefinitely perfectible whereas genius has reached its limit (*CJ*, § 47, pp. 169–70). On this distinction, in all probability, Thomas De Quincey based his famous distinction between the literature of knowledge and the literature of power, designating by the former works of practical information, from cookery to geometry, by the latter works of the imagination. It is perhaps an important index of the reception of Kant in England that De Quincey effectively elides the distinction between taste and genius here: the reader repeats the work of the author and is endowed thereby with some of the latter’s “power.” See De Quincey, “Alexander Pope,” in *Works*, vol. 8 (Edinburgh, 1863), 5–9.
 17. Thomas Huhn has argued to me that this argument can be given a positive valency, reading “the paradox of the exemplary” as “the revelation and critique of pervasive mis-identity because it alone refuses to forge yet another mis-identity”; personal communication, 16 January 1989. This is potentially a very forceful critique of my argument and raises the opportunity to remark that it is precisely the burden of this essay to critique from its very grounds the by now habitual transformation of “the affirmative character of culture” into its negative, critical, but still specular image. For this strategy of Left aesthetics leaves unbroached the necessary task of critiquing the constitutive role of aesthetic culture within the total formation of the political culture of representation, a task which I take to be fundamental to any current rethinking of the politics of cultural education.
 18. Derrida comments in “Parergon,” 108, of a similar passage of the *Critique of Judgment* that

The third *Critique* depends in an essential manner—these examples show it—on a pragmatic anthropology and on what would be called, in more than one sense, a reflexive humanism. This anthropological recourse, recognized in its juridical and formal agency, weighs massively, by its content, on this supposedly pure deduction of aesthetic judgment.

19. The German word that Kant uses throughout the *Third Critique* for “represent” is *vorstellen*. Although Odo Marquard writes extensively and suggestively of a “strikt ver-

trebare Erkenntnissubjekt" (a strictly representable subject) in "Kant und die Wende zur Aesthetik," 244, the concept of *vertreten*, with its double valence of interchange and representation, is as yet only implicit in the structure of Kant's thought. Only in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* does the usage of *vertreten* begin to be attached to aesthetic works, and this still precedes the modern political usage of the term for parliamentary representation. I have discussed these terms further in "Analogies of Aesthetics."

20. Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, 2nd ed. (London, 1983), 187–228; cited in the text hereafter as *BI*.
21. Cf. *BI*, 210. Franco Moretti, in *The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture* (London, 1987), 98, emphasizes the linkage between irony and the novel made by Bakhtin and Yuri Lotman. I should perhaps remark here that Moretti's account of the relation between irony and the impossibility of achieved reconciliation seems to me far more persuasive than de Man's in its account of the contradictions inherent within ironic representation. de Man's circumvention of the relation between irony and the novel even involves him in what is almost an uncharacteristic moment of inverted literary-historical positivism in remarking that "in Germany, for instance, the advent of a fully fledged ironic consciousness . . . certainly does not coincide with a parallel blossoming of the novel" (*BI*, 210).
22. Charles Baudelaire, "De l'essence du rire et généralement du comique dans les arts plastiques," in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1980), 694–95; my translation.
23. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Friend: A Series of Essays to Aid in the Formation of Fixed Principles in Politics, Morals, and Religion, with Literary Amusements Interspersed* (London, 1899), 26. The "Essays on Method," in the same work, are devoted to the exposition of philosophical method in terms of the continual discovery of the inadequacy of any "idols" to represent the truth adequately. In "The Force of Examples," 29–30, Cathy Caruth gives a brilliant demonstration of the relational structure of Kant's symbols that is entirely coherent with this analysis of the methodology of symbolism.
24. In a quite literal sense, John Stuart Mill understands this connection between politics and pedagogy as requiring the agency of the state in the establishment of educational institutions whose principal end is the formation of citizens. See *On Representative Government*, in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (London, 1910), passim but esp. 280: "Universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement." Central to Louis Althusser's analysis of "ideological state apparatuses" are the schools, a fact often overlooked by discussions of his essay, which have tended to emphasize its psychoanalytical dimension. What Althusser grasps most clearly in the concept of interpellation, which indeed has close affinities with the moment of self-consciousness in Baudelaire's pratfalls, is that the formation or hailing of the Subject in any given individual is the formal condition for the transformation of that individual into the ideological form of the citizen. See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1971), 152–57, 174, and 180–83.
25. One can see the tension in Baudelaire's "De l'essence du rire" between the comic as index of a "dualité permanente" in humanity and the developmental history of the comic as a version of this crux of the aesthetic. T. S. Eliot's assertion, on the other hand, of an "ideal order" among artworks is an extreme version of the attempt to escape this crux, but it has as its evident consequence the necessity to substitute myth for history. See "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in *Selected Prose*, ed. John Hayward (Harmondsworth, Eng., 1963), 23. The poetic result of the abandonment of the develop-

mental function of the aesthetic, correlative to Eliot's political royalism and religious Anglicanism, is not so much classicism as the deliberate and defensive deployment of cliché such that it becomes impossible for the reader to claim identification with the "experience" of poet, martyr, or saint, an untraversable gap having been constituted between the postulated inimitable experience and the evacuated forms of the language. *Murder in the Cathedral* and *Four Quartets* are exemplary of this mode both thematically and performatively. The deployment of cliché in this fashion is of course no more than an extension of the dialectic of originality and reproducibility designated ironically as a condition of modern art by Baudelaire's comment that the poet's function is to produce new clichés. See also Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London, 1973), 194: Baudelaire "went so far as to proclaim as his goal 'the creation of a cliché.' In this he saw the condition of every future poet; he had a low opinion of those who were not up to it."

26. The clearest statement of the problem is probably Karl Marx's: "The difficulty we are confronted with is not, however, that of understanding how Greek art and epic poetry are associated with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still give us aesthetic pleasure and are in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable ideal"; "Introduction" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow, 1970), 217. The best discussion of this problem, and the most convincing attempt at its resolution for materialist aesthetics, is Michael McKeon's "The Origins of Aesthetic Value," *Telos* 57 (Fall 1983): 63–82. For a compelling account of the untranscendable "antinomic structure of the aesthetics of the bourgeois age," see Ferene Feher and Agnes Heller, "The Necessity and the Irreformability of Aesthetics," in Feher and Heller, eds., *Reconstructing Aesthetics: Writings of the Budapest School* (Oxford, 1986), 17 and passim.
27. Paul de Man, in a late lecture entitled "Kant and Schiller," characterizes receptions of Kant of which Schiller is exemplary as "a regression from the incisiveness and from the critical impact of the original"; unpublished paper, p. 2 (I am indebted to Lindsay Waters for sending this transcript to me). Hegel's remark on Kant's completion by Schiller can be found in the *Introduction to the Aesthetics*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1979), 61.